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Abstract
Reduction of fiscal evasion may be pursued by introducing incentive
schemes for tax inspectors. The aim of this paper is to explain the
role of such bonuses in an economic environment with corruption,
i.e. in a world where entrepreneurs and tax inspectors are open to
bribery. In detail, we analyze the role of a public incentive scheme,
where the tax inspector’s bargaining strength is endogenous with re-
spect to an incentive mechanism: indeed the knowledge that even if
an entrepreneur does not agree to pay the bribe, s/he can report tax
evasion and be partly rewarded for this, increases the tax inspector’s
bargaining strength.
JEL Code: D73, H26, K42.
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1 Introduction
Tax evasion and fiscal corruption have been a general and persistent prob-
lem throughout history with serious economic consequences even in countries
with developed tax systems. Although there is an extensive literature inves-
tigating the origins, effects and extent of evasion and corruption from both
theoretical and empirical points of view, interaction between tax evasion and
corruption has only been partially explored. It is, in fact, only recently that
this relationship has been investigated by the scientific community. When
tax authorities are dealing with the possibility of corruption, they must
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consider the possibility of taxpayers who underreport their income, bribing
inspectors. It is widely agreed that tax evasion and corruption have several
detrimental effects on the economy. The loss of tax revenues can, in fact,
imply a reduction in public services; in addition, tax evasion and corrup-
tion can seriously harm economic growth (amongst others, Rose-Ackerman,
1975, 1978; Shleifer and Vishny 1993) and distort income distribution as
individuals and firms may have different opportunities for evasion (Hindriks
et al., 1999). Chu (1990) and Bowles (1999) find that corruption among tax
enforcement agents increases income tax evasion, since the effective penalty
is weakened, thus providing a theoretical argument for a positive link be-
tween tax evasion and corruption. Chander and Wilde (1992) take into
account the possibility of collusion between a tax evader and an official au-
ditor whose dishonesty cost is low. In addition, Chander and Wilde (1992)
and Sanyal et al. (2000) show that tax revenues may decline along with
the income tax rate if there are corrupt tax officials. Besley and McLaren
(1993), Hindriks et al. (1999) and Mookherjee and Png (1995) deal with the
issue of optimal remuneration of inspectors. Hindriks et al. (1999) consider
a model where all the actors are dishonest. They show that distributional
effects of evasion and corruption are regressive, as the richest taxpayers have
most to gain from evading taxes and are least vulnerable to extortion (as it
is harder to credibly over–report their income). Mookherjee and Png (1995)
also consider only corruptible agents, although they consider a moral hazard
problem, since the inspector has to exert a costly non–observable effort for
evasion to be disclosed.
This work develops a theoretical model to analyze the effects incentive
schemes, whether private (a bribe) or public (a bonus rate), have on tax
evasion and fiscal corruption. The recent literature has highlighted the ef-
fect that these two types of incentives, whether considered individually or
jointly, may have on tax evasion. Considering them individually, with regard
to the effect that private incentive, i.e. the bribe, can have on the evasion,
as Mookherjee (1977) stressed, the opportunity to negotiate a bribe with
the evading taxpayer, pushes the tax inspector to do more checks in order
to detect evasion. The tax payers anticipate that there is higher probabil-
ity of being inspected and this, the corruptibility of tax inspectors, makes
evasion less attractive. In this way, greater corruptibility of tax inspectors
could lead to less evasion. With regard to the effect that a public system
of incentives, i.e. bonus rate, may have on tax evasion, it should be noted
that, as a growing amount of literature has stressed, incentive schemes can
motivate the tax inspectors to carry out more exhaustive controls (Chand
and Moene, 1999, Das–Guspta and Mookherjee, 1998, Mookherjee, 1997).
In fact, Chand and Moene (1999) set out a model that show how bonus
payments to tax administrators can reduce corruption; the bonus payments
substitute for bribes. A case study from Ghana is used to show how, after a
reform in the public service in 1981, “rampant fiscal corruption was brought
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under control”, thank to the use of bonus payments which stimulated fiscal
officers to greater honesty1.
In order to analyze this fact, we consider an incentive scheme (public) which
guarantees that the tax inspector takes a share of any evaded taxes which are
discovered: this reinforces the inspector’s position in negotiating and obtains
a higher bribe, reducing the attractiveness of evasion. But we must also con-
sider the interaction between the two incentive mechanisms on tax evasion,
in that, as argued by Fjeldstad and Tungodden (2003), the bonus system
provides incentives for the corrupt tax inspector. In fact the awareness by
the tax inspector that s/he can report tax evasion and be partly rewarded
for this, even if the entrepreneur does not agree to pay the bribe, increases
the tax inspector’s bargaining strength. Greater bargaining strength on the
part of the inspector implies that the entrepreneur finds it less worthwhile
to be an evader and, therefore, corrupt. Thus, the presence of corruptible
inspectors strengthens the role of public incentives to combat tax evasion.
Therefore, we rely on a world where tax inspectors and entrepreneurs are
open to bribery and proceed as follows: first, we assume that the State
fights tax evasion through the implementation of incentive schemes for tax
inspectors. The economic profitability of such incentives should be in con-
trast with that of the bribes coming out from a negotiation between inspec-
tors and entrepreneurs, hence corruption; second, we take into account that
incentive schemes affect the bargaining strength of tax inspectors in deter-
mining bribes.
In detail, we construct a bayesian game played by the State, entrepreneurs
and tax inspectors and we explore interaction between fiscal evasion and cor-
ruption. In this context, we analyze the role of a public incentive scheme,
considering that the tax inspector’s bargaining strength is endogenous with
respect to an incentive mechanism. In addition, following Fjeldstad and
Tungodden (2003), we consider how the corruptibility level of a country can
affect a bonus system.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. In
Section 3, we describe the timing of the game and provide the main results.
In Section 4, we endogenize the inspector’s bargaining strength considering
that it depends on the incentive scheme. Section 5 concludes. All proofs of
Propositions are in the Appendix.
2 Theoretical model
Consider an economy composed of three players: the State, tax inspectors
and entrepreneurs. Tax inspectors cannot invest in production activity and
earn a fixed salary λ. Entrepreneurs work in the production sector. The
1For an empirical experiment on the role of public incentives for public official in
Punjab, Pakistan, see Khwaja, Olken and Adnan Khan (2012)
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population of entrepreneurs and tax inspectors is normalized to 1.
The State monitors entrepreneurs’ behavior through tax inspectors, in order
to weed out or reduce evasion, and fixes the level of the tax rate t. The
State also uses its tax revenues to pay the tax inspectors’ wages but there is
no space for financing public productive expenditure. Moreover, in order to
focus more appropriately on the analysis of the incentive schemes, we do not
rely on a budget constraint issue. We assume that taxation is not distortive
regarding input provision. Nature decides the amount of entrepreneurs’
production: in particular, an entrepreneur produces an income y − e with
probability p and y with probability 1−p. In the first case, the entrepreneur
reports the total amount y−e of her/his production, while in the latter case
the entrepreneur can decide to underreport her/his income by the amount
e, and the evasion can be discovered only if the entrepreneur is checked by
a tax inspector2. The tax inspector does not check the entrepreneur if an
amount of y is reported, while s/he can check the entrepreneur in presence
of a declared production of y − e. The tax inspector must decide whether
to check the entrepreneur or not, depending on the cost of the effort of
inspection ω ∈ (0,+∞), on the bribe that the tax inspector can obtain from
the tax evader and on the bonus rate α ∈ (0, 1) that s/he can obtain on
any evasion s/he reports. We assume that ω < et i.e. the evaded amount
is higher than the cost of inspection, as it naturally should be. The tax
inspector who discovers evasion decides whether to report it or to ask for a
bribe: indeed, it is common knowledge that the tax inspector is corruptible
and open to bribery, in the sense that s/he pursues her/his own interest and
not necessarily that of the State.
Let bd be the bribe requested by the tax inspector. Then, in the case in which
the agreement is not reached, the tax inspector reports the tax evader, the
latter incurs a punishment (either monetary, moral or criminal). We assume
that the entrepreneurs are not homogeneous agents and they incur different
“moral costs” when they are reported for being evader3. More precisely, it
is common knowledge that the j-th entrepreneur incurs a specific value cj
to the “moral costs” derived from being caught in evasion (see Cerqueti and
Coppier, 2009 and Cerqueti et al., 2011). If reported, the entrepreneur does
2It is worth noticing that the tax inspector do not have information about the en-
trepreneur before the check. Spcifically, the inspector does not know which entrepreneurs
to control until a superior tells her/him the assigned tasks, and s/he cannot refuse to
control the entrepreneurs which have been allocated.
3In a micro perspective, the concept of “moral costs” has be used to describe one of the
factor which can induce economic agents to engage in corrupt activities. Following Becker
(1968): “A person commits an offense if the expected utility to him exceeds the utility he
could get by using his time and other resources at other activities. Some persons become
criminals, therefore, not because their basic motivation differs from that of other persons,
but because their benefits and costs differ”. More recently, Harstad and Svensson (2011)
consider the individual stigma associated with being penalized for corruption.
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not pay the bribe but must pay taxes ty, and suffers the “moral costs” cj4.
3 The game: description and solution
Given the framework described above, we can formalize the economic prob-
lem into a five-period game with incomplete information.
As already stated in the previous section, the game works as follows: in the
first stage, Nature decides the entrepreneur’s income: y with probability
1 − p and y − e with probability p; in the second stage, the entrepreneur
declares the amount of income; in the third stage, the tax inspector decides
whether to check the entrepreneur’s declaration or not; in the fourth stage
the tax inspector decides whether to ask for a bribe or not, if a false decla-
ration is detected; in the fifth stage, the entrepreneur must take the decision
of whether to pay the bribe or not.
For a clear exposition, we present the game by distinguishing the cases of
high or low income. The payoff vector will be indicated with a triple
pi = (piE , piS , piI), (1)
where piE , piS and piI represent the payoffs of the j-th entrepreneur, the
State5 and the tax inspector, respectively.
The stepwise scheme of the game is the following:
First stage
Nature decides the amount of the entrepreneur’s production. In particular,
the entrepreneur produces an amount y − e with probability p and y with
probability 1− p.
Bad state of the Nature: income y − e
The entrepreneur produces y − e.
Second stage
The entrepreneur declares y − e.
Third stage
The tax inspector must decide whether to check the declared income or not.
The game ends in both cases. The payoffs are:{
pi2 = ((1− t)(y − e), t(y − e), λ), if not check;
pi4 = ((1− t)(y − e), t(y − e), λ− ω), if check. (2)
4We assume perfect knowledge of the term cj by all the players in this game, in the
sense that there is an objective measure of the entrepreneurs’ moral damage.
5Naturally, the payoff of the State should be understood as the income from taxes paid
by the j-th entrepreneur net of the bonus share paid to the inspector.
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Good state of the Nature: income y
The entrepreneur produces y.
Second stage
The entrepreneur must decide the amount of income to declare: y or y−e. If
the entrepreneur decides to be honest and declare y, then the tax inspector
does not check the entrepreneur’s production and the game ends with the
following payoff vector:
pi1 = ((1− t)y, ty, λ). (3)
Otherwise, the game continues to stage three.
Third stage
If the entrepreneur declares y−e, then the tax inspector must decide whether
to check the entrepreneur’s production or not. If the tax inspector does not
check the entrepreneur’s production, then the entrepreneur pays only the
taxes on declared income (y−e). The tax revenues for the State are (y−e)t
and the tax inspector receives his wage λ. The game ends with following
payoff vector:
pi3 = (y − (y − e)t, t(y − e), λ). (4)
Otherwise, the game continues to stage four.
Fourth stage
The tax inspector checks the entrepreneur’s production and must decide
whether to report the evasion or to ask for a bribe bd. If the tax inspector
reports the evasion, then the entrepreneur must pay the taxes on all income
y and, in addition, s/he incurs a “moral costs” cj ; the State receives the
taxes ty, but must pay the bonus share α on the reported evasion et; finally,
the tax inspector obtains her/his wage, minus ω, plus the bonus share αet.
The game ends with the following payoff vector:
pi5 = ((1− t)y − cj , ty − αet, λ− ω + αet). (5)
Otherwise, the game continues to stage five.
Fifth stage
The tax inspector asks the entrepreneur for a bribe bd > 0. If the agreement
is not achieved, the tax inspector reports the entrepreneur. There is no
penalty for the tax inspector, and the game ends with the following payoff
vector:
pi6 = ((1− t)y − cj , ty − αet, λ− ω + αet). (6)
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Otherwise the negotiation starts, and the two parties will find the bribe bNB
corresponding to the Nash solution to a bargaining game, and the game
ends. This bribe is the outcome of a negotiation between the inspector
and the entrepreneur, who will be assumed to share a given surplus. The
entrepreneur pays the bribe and is not reported. The game ends with the
payoff vector given by:
pi7 = (y − (y − e)t− bNB, t(y − e), λ− ω + bNB). (7)
In order to proceed to the solution of the game, we firstly provide an explicit
expression of the bribe bNB.
Proposition 3.1. There is a unique bribe bNB, as the Nash solution to the
bargaining game, given by:
bNB = αet+ µ[cj + et(1− α)]. (8)
where µ ≡ ²²+β is the share of the surplus that goes to the tax inspector, and
² and β are parameters that can be interpreted as measures of bargaining
strength of the tax inspector and the entrepreneur respectively.
The game with incomplete information has been solved using the back-
ward induction method starting from the last stage of the game. Its solution
is formalized by the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. There exist two thresholds for the “moral costs” ξ1, ξ2 ∈
(0,+∞) and a threshold for the probability p1 ∈ (0, 1) such that
(a) If 1− p > p1, then:
(a.1) if cj ≤ ξ1, the game ends with random payoff vector
piA =
{
pi3 with probability 1− p,
pi2 with probability p;
(a.2) if ξ1 < cj ≤ ξ2, the game ends with random payoff vector
piB =
{
pi7 with probability 1− p,
pi4 with probability p;
(a.3) if cj > ξ2, the game ends with random payoff vector
piC =
{
pi1 with probability 1− p,
pi4 with probability p;
(b) If 1− p ≤ p1, then:
(b.1) if cj ≤ ξ1, the game ends with payoff vector piA.
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(b.2) if cj > ξ1, the game ends with payoff vector piC .
The previous proposition shows that we obtain different perfect Nash
equilibria in the sub-games, depending on the parameter values. The dis-
tinction between the good and the bad state of Nature is needed.
If the income of the entrepreneur is y − e, two equilibria without evasion
occur:
• pi2 is associated to the equilibrium with no check.
• pi4 is associated to the equilibrium with check.
When the income of the entrepreneur is y, then three equilibria occur:
• pi1 is associated to the equilibrium with no evasion.
• pi3 is associated to the equilibrium with undetected evasion;
• pi7 is associated to the equilibrium with evasion and corruption.
The case of the good state of Nature is the one allowing corruption and
evasion. Therefore, even if the game is solved by taking into account both
the states of Nature, we will focus our discussion on the case in which the
income of the entrepreneur is y, i.e. on equilibria pi1, pi3 and pi7.
In order to give greater insight to the presentation of the results, let us
rename the thresholds found for the “moral costs”:
• ξ1. We call this threshold the Inspector Monitoring Threshold (IMT)
because if the “moral costs” are less than ξ1, the tax inspector will
find it worthwhile not to carry out any checks on the entrepreneur;
if the “moral costs” are greater than ξ1, the tax inspector will find it
worthwhile to carry out checks on the entrepreneur;
• ξ2. We call this threshold the Entrepreneur Evasion Threshold (EET)
because if the j-th entrepreneur has “moral costs” greater than ξ2, the
entrepreneur will find it worthwhile to be honest; the j-th entrepreneur
with “moral costs” less than ξ2 will find it worthwhile to evade.
The equilibria achieved depend, in almost all cases, on the probability of
occurrence of a state of Nature. In fact a high probability p (1 − p ≤ p1)
implies that there is high probability that bad states of Nature, i.e. with
low production, will occur and, therefore, in this case, the inspector will
consider it more plausible if income equal to y − e is reported. To make a
more intuitive representation of results, we call the cases in which 1−p > p1
“Expansion” and those in which 1− p ≤ p1 “Recession”.
In particular:
(a) “Expansion”. In this circumstance, there is a low likelihood of adverse
states of Nature (production equal to y − e).
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(a.1) Equilibrium with undetected evasion applies. As the “moral
costs” of the j-th entrepreneur are less than the IMT, the inspec-
tor will find that it is not worthwhile to carry out checks on the
entrepreneur, for the simple reason that the effort of inspecting
is not compensated by the small amount of the bribe. Simulta-
neously, the entrepreneur will find it worthwhile to underreport
her/his income, because the “moral costs” are low.
(a.2) Equilibrium with evasion and corruption applies. Under
these parameter conditions, the entrepreneur will find it worth-
while to underreport her/his income, since the “moral costs” are
smaller than the EET. Now the “moral costs” are higher than the
IMT, and the possible bribe is quite large. Moreover, there is a
high probability that the low production declared is not the real
entrepreneur’s income, in that the expansion case is actually oc-
curring. Therefore, the tax inspector finds it worthwhile to check
the entrepreneur’s production. The negotiated bribe is so small
for the entrepreneur, that the detected evader prefers to agree to
it rather than being reported.
(a.3) Equilibrium without evasion applies. Following the argu-
ments of the previous case, the inspector checks the entrepreneur’s
production. Furthermore, since the “moral costs” are higher than
the EET, the payoff that the entrepreneur can get by evading
(with corruption) is lower than that which would be obtained by
declaring all her/his income. In this case, then the entrepreneur
will be honest and will report all income.
(b) “Recession”. In this case, a high probability p (1 − p ≤ p1) implies
that there is a high probability that bad states of Nature, i.e. with
low production (y − e), will occur.
(b.1) Equilibrium with undetected evasion applies. The “moral
costs” of the j-th entrepreneur are less than the IMT. Hence,
the inspector will find that it is not worthwhile to check en-
trepreneur’s production, for two reasons: firstly, the effort of in-
specting is greater than the equilibrium bribe; secondly, there is
a high probability that the low production declared is the en-
trepreneur’s real income. At the same time, the entrepreneur
underreports her/his income, because the “moral costs” are low.
(b.2) Equilibrium without evasion applies. The monitoring activ-
ity takes place, because the “moral costs” are higher than the
IMT, and then the possible bribe is of a large amount. Further-
more, since the “moral costs” are higher than the EET, then the
same arguments developed in (a.3) apply, and the entrepreneur
will be honest.
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The State, in order to reduce evasion and corruption, can use different tools.
It is important to note that tax evasion can be reduced through greater con-
trol by the inspectors and greater social stigma associated with corruption,
i .e. the corruptibility level of entrepreneurs. The probability of being con-
trolled by an inspector is endogenous and depends on economic factors such
as incentive schemes, bargaining power of the inspector and tax rate. With
regard to the effect that a public system of incentives, i.e. bonus rate, may
have on ta evasion, we will demonstrate in the next paragraph, that incen-
tive schemes can motivate the tax inspectors to carry out more exhaustive
controls. In addition we will consider the link between incentive schemes
and bargaining power of the tax inspector. Therefore, here we perform a
sensitivity analysis on the role of tax rate on the level of honesty. As we
said, we found two thresholds ξ1 and ξ2. We called ξ1 the Inspector Mon-
itoring Threshold (IMT) because if the “moral costs” are less than ξ1, the
tax inspector will find it worthwhile not to carry out any checks on the
entrepreneur; if the “moral costs” are greater than ξ1, then the tax inspec-
tor will find it worthwhile to carry out checks on the entrepreneur. The
threshold ξ2 will be denoted hereafter as the Entrepreneur Evasion Thresh-
old (EET) because if the j-th entrepreneur has “moral costs” greater than
ξ2, the entrepreneur will find it worthwhile to be honest, while the j-th en-
trepreneur with “moral costs” less than ξ2 will find it worthwhile to evade.
ξ1 is the relevant threshold in the “Recession” case:
∂ξ1
∂t
= − 1
µ
αe− (1− α)e < 0 (9)
Therefore, as the tax rate increases, the economic incentive for the tax in-
spector to control increases as well, in that ξ1 decreases. This greater control
induces entrepreneurs to be more honest.
Viceversa, ξ2 is the relevant threshold in the “Expansion” case:
∂ξ2
∂t
=
(1− µ)e(1− α)
µ
> 0 (10)
Therefore, as the tax rate increases, the economic incentive for the en-
trepreneur to evade increases as well, in that ξ2 grows. This leads to a
reduction of the entrepreneur’s honesty.
Thus, the tax rate has a twofold effect. If the economy is in “Recession”
case, then the monitoring activity level of inspectors is low and, therefore,
an increase of the tax rate, which increases control, promotes entrepreneur’s
honesty. Viceversa, in the “Expansion” case, the incentive to evading and
bribing increases as the tax rate grows. In fact, when the tax rate increases,
then the growth of the surplus deriving from evasion compensates largely
the greater control of the inspector. This opens up spaces for evasion and
corruption. With regard to corruptibility level of entrepreneurs, the State,
in order to reduce evasion, could increase the social stigma due to being
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detected in a corrupt transaction6. In this case, the greater “moral costs”
reduce, at aggregate level, the number of entrepreneurs corrupted, i.e. with
specific “moral costs” cj > ξ2.
4 The role of incentives in fighting evasion
The presence of an incentive scheme for tax inspectors reduces the occur-
rence of tax evasion, as evidence suggests. A formal proof of this fact can
be derived directly from the solution of the game in Proposition 3.2. Such
a case is associated to the following conditions:
1− p > p1, cj > ξ2;
1− p ≤ p1, cj > ξ1.
(11)
The measure of the interval [ξ2, 1] (case of expansion) or [ξ1, 1] (case of
recession) can be viewed as a proxy of the honesty level of the society. In
particular, the level of honesty of the Country grows as the measure of such
an interval increases.
If ξ2 ≥ 1 (case of expansion) or ξ1 ≥ 1 (case of recession), then Proposition
3.2 assures that the equilibrium with no evasion does not occur.
The idea that supports the analysis in this section, as already stated, is
that not only the introduction of a public bonus certainly make evasion less
attractive for the tax inspector, but also the bonus system interacts with
the corruptibility of tax inspectors. To be more precise, the bonus rate
for the tax inspector makes her/him stronger in her/his negotiation with
the taxpayer and, as a result, when corruption takes place, s/he receives
a larger part of the pie for not reporting the evasion to the tax authorities
(see Fjeldstad and Tugodden, 2003). In light of this consideration, we would
like to point out the interaction between bonus share and corruptibility,
endogenyzing the bargaining power of the tax inspector µ with respect to
the bonus rate α. In particular, we model the hypothesis that, as the bonus
rate grows the bargaining strength of the tax inspector also grows and,
consequently, the bargaining power of the taxpayer decreases. This simple
analysis allows us to highlight the increased effectiveness of the public system
of incentives in the presence of widespread corruptibility. In order to do this,
we analyze how incentives α influence the honesty level of the Country in
two situations:
6However, it is poorly understood what exactly, on the micro-level, the determinants of
corruptibility are and what institutional arrangements could be used to fight (the causes
of) corruption. For an experiment see e.g. Dusek (2005): their results suggest strongly
that the extent of corruption in a society is a major determinant of corruptibility. The
related but preliminary results confirm this result and suggest that inequality aversion is
an additional determinant.
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• the parameter α does not affect the other terms of the model. This
will be denoted as the simple case;
• the parameter α influences the bargaining strength of the inspector.
In this case, we consider the interaction between the bonus rate and
the bargaining strength of tax inspector: to be more precise, greater
α means greater µ. This will be denoted as the complex case.
While the analysis in the former case is straightforward and we report it
only for comparison purposes, in the latter we have a further effect of the
incentive parameter on the honesty level through the bargaining parameter
µ.
Simple case
The relationship between the honesty level of the society and the bonus rate
α is formalized in the following result.
Proposition 4.1. Assume that 1− p > p1. There exists α1 ∈ R such that:
• α ≤ α1 is equivalent to ξ2 ≥ 1, and the equilibrium with no-evasion
vanishes;
• α > α1 if and only if 1− ξ2 increases with respect to α.
Assume that 1− p ≤ p1. There exists α2, α3 ∈ R such that:
• α ≤ α2 is equivalent to ξ1 ≥ 1, and the equilibrium with no-evasion
disappears;
• α ∈ (α2, α3) if and only if 1− ξ1 increases with respect to α;
• α ≥ α3 equals to ξ1 ≤ 0, and the game ends always in the equilibrium
with no-evasion.
Complex case
In this case, the bargaining power of the tax inspector µ is assumed to be
positively related to the bonus rate α. To model this behaviour, we assume
the existence of a number τ ∈ (0, 1) such that µ = τα. The thresholds ξ1
and ξ2 become:
ξ1 =
1
τα
·
(
ω
1− p − αet
)
+ (α− 1)et; (12)
ξ2 =
et(1− τα)(1− α)
τα
. (13)
The following result summarizes how the honesty level of the society depends
on the bonus rate.
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Table 1: Simple case
Expansion
Low bonus rate Minimum level of honesty
High bonus rate Increasing level of honesty
Recession
Low bonus rate Minimum level of honesty
Medium bonus rate Increasing level of honesty
High bonus rate Maximum level of honesty
Table 2: Complex case
Expansion
Low bonus rate Minimum level of honesty
High bonus rate Increasing level of honesty
Recession
Low bonus rate Minimum level of honesty
High bonus rate Increasing level of honesty
Proposition 4.2. Assume that 1 − p > p1. There exists α4 ∈ (0, 1) such
that:
• α ≤ α4 is equivalent to ξ2 ≥ 1, and the equilibrium with no-evasion
disappears;
• α > α5 if and only if 1− ξ2 increases with respect to α.
Assume that 1− p ≤ p1. There exists α5 ∈ (0, 1) such that:
• α ≥ α5 is equivalent to ξ1 ≥ 1, and the equilibrium with no-evasion
disappears;
• α < α5 if and only if 1− ξ1 increases with respect to α.
Tables 1 and 2 sum up the relationship between honesty level and bonus
rate in simple and complex cases, respectively.
Comparison between the cases
A comparison between the simple case and the complex one is now needed.
We start from the evidence, already stressed above, that the measure of
honesty level is given by 1−ξ2 (case of expansion) or 1−ξ1 (case of recession).
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Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 assure that the honesty level grows as the entity of
the bonus rate increases, in the whole set of cases and in recession as well as
in expansion. We here want to discuss how such a growth takes place, i.e.
we want to emphasize the effectiveness of the instrument of public incentives
when we are in the presence of corruptible inspectors. More specifically, we
perform a comparison between the rates of growth in the simple and complex
cases.
The following result summarizes our findings.
Proposition 4.3. Assume that 1− p > p1. Define:
fS(α) =
∂
∂α
(1− ξ2), ξ2 as in (24);
fC(α) =
∂
∂α
(1− ξ2), ξ2 as in (13).
We have: fC(α)− fS(α) > 0 if and only if µ > τα2.
Now, assume 1− p ≤ p1. Define:
gS(α) =
∂
∂α
(1− ξ1), ξ1 as in (19);
gC(α) =
∂
∂α
(1− ξ1), ξ1 as in (12).
We have: gC(α)− gS(α) > 0 if and only if µ > τα2 · 1−pp1 .
It is worth noting that µ = τα implies that the conditions on µ in the
first and in the second part of the enunciation are trivially true. Indeed:
• µ = τα > τα2, being α ∈ (0, 1);
• µ = τα > τα2 · 1−pp1 , being α ∈ (0, 1) and 1− p ≤ p1.
Hence, the rate of growth of the honesty level with respect to the bonus
rate α is higher in the complex case than in the simple one, in both cases of
recession or expansion and for each level of α ∈ (0, 1). This result was rather
expected: indeed, as already discussed above, the action of the parameter α
on the honesty level is stronger in the complex case than in the simple one.
In fact, when considering not only the effect of the two incentive schemes
(private and public) individually, but also their interaction, we obtain the
result that an environment in which inspectors are highly corruptible, the
introduction or strengthening of an incentive system is more effective.
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5 Conclusions
This work develops a theoretical model for analyzing the role of incentive
schemes where there is fiscal corruption, i.e. in a world where tax inspec-
tors are open to bribery. We consider that two types of incentives for the
reduction of evasion can exist: a legal, public incentive scheme which im-
plies that the tax inspector takes a share of any discovered evaded taxes; an
illegal private incentive represented by a bribe which the tax inspector can
ask from the entrepreneur caught evading. We analyze not only the effects
which these two incentives can have on evasion, but also the effect which
derives from the interaction between these two different incentives.
In details, we develop a bayesian game played by the State, entrepreneurs
and tax inspectors and we explore interaction between fiscal evasion and cor-
ruption. The possibility of negotiating bribes with tax evaders (corruption)
pushes the inspectors to carry out more checks. If this is anticipated by the
taxpayers, the potential corruption makes tax evasion less attractive because
it increases the likelihood of detection. In this way, greater corruptibility of
tax inspectors could lead to less evasion and higher tax revenues. Further-
more, we analyze the role of a public incentive scheme, considering that the
tax inspector’s bargaining strength is endogenous with respect to an incen-
tive mechanism: indeed the knowledge that even if the entrepreneur does
not agree to pay the bribe, the tax inspector can report tax evasion and be
partly rewarded for this, increases the tax inspector’s bargaining strength.
We take into account that entrepreneurs have different degrees of corruptibil-
ity: in fact we assume that the entrepreneurs incur different “moral costs”
when they are reported for evasion. More precisely, the j-th entrepreneur
suffers a moral damage of value cj due to the objective punishment when
the evasion is detected, and this assumption can modify the implications of
a bonus system. Our model provides guidance on the relationship between
the integrity of a country, the bonus rate for tax inspectors and evasion. To
be more precise, we demonstrate that, in countries with high inner honesty
there is no evasion, regardless of incentive schemes. In countries with inner
honesty in the middle range, in expansion, there is evasion and corruption
is not detected. Conversely, in countries with low inner honesty, we must
distinguish between favorable or unfavorable economic situations. Indeed,
in an economy in recession, there is only undetected evasion because, in this
case, it is very plausible that the low income reported by the entrepreneurs
is grounded on a negative economic situation rather than evasion. Then the
tax inspectors, with low incentives (and bargaining power), will not make
checks and thus, the entrepreneurs will find it worthwhile to evade. In con-
trast, in an economy in expansion, the inspector does not have necessary
incentives to check the entrepreneur.
Regarding the interaction between the tax inspector’s corruptibility and
public incentive schemes, we show that the presence of widespread corrupt-
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ibility reinforces the effectiveness of government incentives. In fact, the
presence of a system of bonus shares for the inspectors strengthens their
position in negotiating the bribe, making corruption, and therefore tax eva-
sion, less attractive. This simple model, therefore, offers an easy policy:
the instrument of incentives paid to the inspectors is more effective and
therefore, more desirable in the fight against tax evasion in a highly corrupt
environment.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Let φ
∆
= φ(E)∆ , φ
(I)
∆ be the vector of the differences in the payoffs between
the case of agreement and disagreement regarding the bribe between the
entrepreneur and the tax inspector. In accordance with generalized Nash
bargaining theory, the division between two agents will solve:
max
b∈R+
[φ(E)∆ ]
β · [φ(I)∆ ]² (14)
in formula
max
b∈R+
[et− b+ cj ]β [b− αet]² (15)
which is the maximum of the product between the elements of φ
∆
. The
parameters β and ² can be interpreted as measures of bargaining strength
of the entrepreneur and tax inspector, respectively.
The first order condition gives:
[et− b+ cj ]β−1 [b− αet]²−1 {β [b− αet] + ² [et− b+ cj ]} = 0,
which leads to an asymmetric (or generalized) Nash bargaining solution,
which is the unique equilibrium bribe bNB in the last subgame:
bNB = αet+ µ[cj + et(1− α)]. (16)
The parameter µ = ²²+β reflects the distribution of bargaining strength
between the two agents.
Proof of Proposition 3.2
The static game is solved using backward induction, which enables the equi-
libria to be obtained.
(5) At stage five, the entrepreneur negotiates the bribe if, and only if,
∆EA = pi
E
7 − piE6 > 0,
that is: if the entrepreneur negotiates the bribe her/his payoff is
greater than her/his payoff if s/he refuses. Such a condition is equiv-
alent to
cj > et(α− 1),
that is always satisfied. Hence, s/he will find it worthwhile to negotiate
the bribe.
19
(4) Ascending the decision-making tree, at stage four the tax inspector
decides whether or not to ask for a bribe. The tax inspector knows that
if s/he asks for a bribe then the entrepreneur will start a negotiation
and the final bribe will be bNB. Then, at stage four the tax inspector
asks for a bribe if and only if the tax inspector’s payoff on asking for
a bribe is greater than the payoff if s/he doesn’t, i.e. if
∆IB = pi
I
7 − piI5 > 0.
Such a condition is equivalent to
cj > (α− 1)et,
that is always true. Hence, the tax inspector will ask for a bribe.
(3) At stage three, the tax inspector must decide whether to inspect the
entrepreneur or not: the tax inspector checks the entrepreneur’s be-
havior if and only if the tax inspector’s expected payoff on checking
the evader is greater than her/his expected payoff if s/he doesn’t. De-
note as pi(I)C and pi
(I)
NC the random variables associated to the payoff
of the tax inspector when checking or not checking the entrepreneur,
respectively. We introduce the expected value operator as E. We need
to analyze
∆(I)C = E[pi
(I)
C ]−E[pi(I)NC ].
We have
E[pi(I)NC ] = pλ+ λ(1− p) = λ. (17)
When checking, the tax inspector will ask for a bribe and such a bribe
will be negotiated by the entrepreneur. Therefore, the expected payoff
of the tax inspector when checking is:
E[pi(I)C ] = p(λ− ω) + (1− p){λ− ω + αet+ µ[cj + et(1− α)]}. (18)
Therefore
∆(I)C = −ω + (1− p){αet+ µ[cj + et(1− α)]} > 0
if and only if
cj > ξ1 =
1
µ
·
(
ω
1− p − αet
)
+ (α− 1)et, (19)
so that:
(3.1) if cj > ξ1, the tax inspector checks the entrepreneur’s production;
(3.2) if cj ≤ ξ1, the tax inspector does not check the entrepreneur’s
production.
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(2) At stage two the entrepreneur must decide whether to underreport
her/his income. The case with production y − e is trivial. If the
income is y, the decision is driven by the payoffs. Denote as pi(E)R
and pi(E)NR the payoff of the entrepreneur when reporting y or y − e,
respectively. In this case, the entrepreneur reports her/his income if
and only if
∆(E)R = pi
(E)
R − pi(E)NR > 0.
We can write
pi
(E)
R = (1− t)y. (20)
The payoff of the entrepreneur when underreporting depends on the
value of cj .
(2.1) If cj ≤ ξ1, then the tax inspector does not check the entrepreneur’s
production. In this case:
pi
(E)
NR = y − t(y − e), (21)
and we have
∆(E)R = −et < 0.
The game ends with random payoff{
pi3 with probability 1− p,
pi2 with probability p.
(22)
(2.2) If cj > ξ1, then the tax inspector finds it worthwhile to check the
entrepreneur. Moreover, in this case the bribe bNB is required by
the tax inspector and accepted by the entrepreneur.
pi
(E)
NR = y − (y − e)t− αet− µ(cj + et(1− α)). (23)
Thus we have
∆(E)R = µcj − et(1− α)(1− µ) > 0
if and only if
cj > ξ2 =
et(1− µ)(1− α)
µ
. (24)
Some cases can be distinguished.
(2.2.1) If cj > ξ2, and the entrepreneur decides to report y. The
game ends with random payoff{
pi1 with probability 1− p,
pi4 with probability p.
(25)
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(2.2.2) If cj ≤ ξ2, then the entrepreneur decides to report y−e. The
game ends with random payoff{
pi7 with probability 1− p,
pi4 with probability p.
(26)
To complete the proof, define
p1 =
ω
et
.
Some straightforward computations give:{
1− p > p1 ⇒ ξ2 > ξ1;
1− p < p1 ⇒ ξ2 < ξ1. (27)
Proof of Proposition 4.1
The proof is trivial. The critical values of α are:
α1 = 1− µ(1− µ)et , α2 =
ω
1−p − µ(1 + et)
(1− µ)et , α3 =
ω
1−p − µet
(1− µ)et .
Proof of Proposition 4.2
Some tedious and straightforward algebraic manipulations give that:
• if 1− p > p1, then ξ2 ∈ (0, 1) if and only if
α > α4 =
et(1 + τ) + τ −√[et(1 + τ) + τ ]2 − 4(et)2τ
2etτ
,
where α4 ∈ (0, 1);
• if 1− p ≤ p1, then ξ1 ∈ (0, 1) if and only if
α < α5 =
et(1 + τ) + τ −
√
[et(1 + τ) + τ ]2 − 4etτω1−p
2etτ
,
where α5 ∈ (0, 1).
Tho complete the proof, it is sufficient to observe that
∂(1− ξ2)
∂α
=
et(1− τα2)
τα2
> 0, ∀α ∈ (α4, 1]
and
∂(1− ξ1)
∂α
=
ω
1−p − etτα2
τα2
> 0, ∀α ∈ [0, α5).
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Proof of Proposition 4.3
The result states immediately, by observing that
fS(α) =
et(1− µ)
µ
; fC(α) =
et(1− τα2)
τα2
and
gS(α) =
et(1− µ)
µ
; gC(α) =
ω
1−p − etτα2
τα2
.
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